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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on Federal law as it relates to consent to search
relating to Fourth Amendment privacy in the practice of Digital
Forensics. In particular, Digital Examiners should be aware of how
decisions in Federal Court may impact their ability to acquire evidence
in both civil and criminal settings. Digital Forensics, being a relatively
new field, is particularly subject to change as cases and appeals are
decided. This paper provides an overview of relevant case law relating
to issues in Digital Forensics. More importantly, our research provides
Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE), as defined by Lonardo, White, and
Rea (2008, 2009), with scenarios that illustrate the various nuances
when dealing with the consent to search. From issues of common
authority, conflicting consent, apparent authority, and voluntary consent,
our research explores court findings and applies them to practical advice
and policy formation for DFEs.
Keywords: digital forensics, case study, consent to search, federal law, fourth
amendment
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we address current developments in the law relating to third party
"consent to search" and the Fourth Amendment within the practice of Digital
Forensics as defined by Lonardo, White, and Rea (2008). The various issues
relating to third party consent are illustrated through various federal circuit court
cases and the US Supreme Court and represent the challenges and issues of which
one needs to be aware. This is critical as the legal environment surrounding
Digital Forensics is rapidly developing as judges and attorneys undertake a more
informed technical and legal analysis. For the Digital Forensic Examiner (DFE)
these cases will provide insights to DFEs how the courts view computer forensics
by way of evidentiary, fourth amendment and other legal issues raised on appeal.
We have organized this paper by the primary facets of comment authority,
conflicting consent, apparent authority, and voluntary consent. Each major topical
area is discussed with supporting relevant case law to illustrate how the courts
approach each relevant DFE issue. Please note that given the limited precedent
regarding the subject matter, courts often rely on analogies that are not computer
technology based and we do the same. However, we do place it within a DFE
context. Before proceeding, we need to provide not only our definition of Digital
Forensic Examiners but also situate it within the context of the Fourth
Amendment.
1.1 Defining Digital Forensic Examiners
The role of Digital Forensic Examiners has increased within legal casework in the
last ten years. As a result, the scope of the profession, increased salaries, and
number of examiners has grown immensely due to the need in most evidentiary
circumstances for expertise in digital media examination (White, Micheletti, &
Glorfeld, 2008; White, Michelletti, Glorfeld, & Rea, 2006). This increased
involvement in all facets of law and government has led to challenges for DFEs,
states, and the courts in determining the nature and definition of the DFE role.
These challenges require us to examine just what defines a Digital Forensic
Examiner (DFE). Many researchers have approached the definition, but we will
follow the definition put forth by Lonardo et al. (2008) because it is used as a
framework on which state statutes and other accrediting bodies have been
analyzed:

A Digital Examiner deals with extracting, gathering, and
analyzing data from a computer or computers, networks, and
other digital media with subsequent preparation of reports and
opinions of this media for evidentiary or other states purposes
such as data/digital security, audit, or assessment. [See also
Lonardo et al. (2009)].
Although this definition seems straightforward, as the DFE role's purview has
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expanded into more and more courtrooms, the questions of the breadth of the
examiner in terms of procurement of evidence have also increased not only in
terms of the processes in place but also the technology examined. Our focus in
this paper is the technology because advances have produced situations requiring
greater and greater levels of expertise in the procurement of both civil and
criminal evidence and, as a result, created a need to review the relevant court
opinions on these issues.
1.2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
Digital Forensic Examiners, who are not practicing as officers of the court or in
other law enforcement roles, are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. However,
the continued push for "privacy" and "information privacy" has led many
examiners to include custodial approvals and other "permissions" in their civil
collection procedures. In this light, the idea of the Fourth Amendment is pervasive
in the practice of digital forensics and is a focus of our paper.
In summary, the Fourth Amendment pertains to government activity in searches,
not those by private parties unless the private party is deemed as an agent for the
government (i.e. law enforcement.):

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis added)
The concept of third party consent to search revolves around the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and specifically is concerned as to
whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location that is
searched ("Katz v. U.S.," 1967). However, the Fourth Amendment does not
specifically speak of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" because it is a doctrine
of law set forth by the US Supreme Court (USSC) in cases interpreting whether a
search is "unreasonable."
Practice demonstrates that the higher the expectation of privacy, the higher the
protected rights are from searches, and the higher the likelihood a search warrant
would be required. The courts analyze the "totality of the circumstances" for each
case under review ("Illinois v. Rodriguez," 1990). This means that a particular
court reviews the facts on a case-by-case basis in making a determination whether
third party consent is valid. As a result, there is no "bright line rule" as to what
makes a search based on third party consent legal and valid, thereby making this a
challenge. However, the crux of the question can hinge on situations where
consent given to law enforcement is found to be knowing and voluntary, thereby
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not implicating the Fourth Amendment and making the search and/or seizure
valid ("Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," 1973).
As a result of the voluntary delineation, one of the most critical focuses in digital
forensics is the idea of "consent." Consent is most dramatically at the forefront
when examiners are involved in a situation where a family member or other third
party "gives permission" to examine another person's media or device. In civil
examinations, it is common for IT administrators, HR representatives, or other
members of the corporate management team to grant a Digital Forensic Examiner
the permission to review or obtain evidence from digital media. In these cases the
computer and its contents are typically the property of the company or business
and the employee has no possessory or legal rights.
However, outside of the corporate content, many questions regarding the nature of
consent and the right to examine both media and data becomes an issue for the
DFE. In the following sections we examine cases that detail situations in which
the express permission of the actual owner of that evidence may not be apparent
and can hamper the DFE's ability to review and produce usable evidence.
2. COMMON AUTHORITY
The concept of common authority directly relates to the idea that multiple parties
may have access to, or some level of control over, media that is not necessarily
shared but may be accessed communally. For example, portable media such as a
USB flash drive that is plugged into a roommate's computer.
Digital Forensics Issue: If the roommate consents to the examination of his
personal computer, does this consent include the roommate's USB flash drive
plugged into the computer?
Common authority might be simply defined as "When a party has free access and
the authority to enter an area or use an item, that item/area is under common
authority." The U.S. Supreme Court underscores this definition:

The authority which justified the third-party consent does not
rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and
legal refinement, but rests rather on mutual use of the property
by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched. ("Georgia
v. Randolph," 2006) [quoting ("United States v. Matlock,"
1974)] (Emphasis added)
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2.1 Conflicting Consent and Computer Drives
However, a critical issue that emerges from this definition is conflicting consent.
Consider the Georgia v. Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006) case:
Facts: Estranged wife gave police consent to search the home. She previously
moved in with some relatives for a few weeks and it was not clear whether she
was moving back permanently to reconcile or was there to pick up personal
effects. Both the estranged wife and husband were physically present. The
husband denied consent and the wife granted the consent to search. Police entered
the home and searched it finding traces of drugs and ultimately obtaining a
warrant.
Issue: When a co-tenant objects to a search of an apartment or home in the
presence of the consenting co-tenant does that objection override the consenting
party where both have common authority over the premises?
Court's ruling: First, the ability to grant consent rests with whether the person
granting the consent has "common authority" to do so. In other words, does the
consenting party have free access and authority to certain areas of the home or
apartment shared by both habitants? Secondly, even if one person has the
common authority, if the cohabitant with shared common authority and access is
physically present and refuses to grant the authority then law enforcement must
abide by the non-consenting cohabitant's wishes.
Digital Forensic Implications: Thus, Randolph might imply that a
spouse/partner might be able to grant consent particularly when an item is
shared or an area of the drive is shared between multiple parties. It would not
be the case that this would grant consent to search protected or privileged areas
of the drive or device belonging to a spouse/partner.
However, Randolph would not perhaps cover the aforementioned USB flash drive
as illustrated in the following case ("United States v. King," 2010) in which a
non-consenting party's ownership of the hard drive installed in consenting party's
computer was granted by the third party.
Facts: Person who resided with the defendant was arrested and consented to a
seizure of the personal computer (PC) that she owned. King assisted with the
surrender by disconnecting the PC. King told police he installed the hard drive on
the PC and claimed ownership of it. He then asked law enforcement if he could
remove it as the owner. Police refused his request. In searching the PC certain
incriminating email correspondence was found between the owner of the PC and
King. This correspondence led to a search warrant of the defendant's home and
the seized computer. As a result of this search the police found thousands of
images of child pornography in addition to the incriminating emails. King
voluntarily met with police and after several hours admitted having sexual
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relations with the daughter of the PC owner. Ultimately, King pled guilty for
having engaged in a sexual act with a person under the age of 12 according to 18
U.S.C. (UnitedStates, 2010a). Later, King attempted to withdraw his plea, but a
lower court denied his request.
Issue: At issue here is "when an owner of a computer consents to its seizure, does
that consent include the computer's hard drive even when it was installed by
another who claims ownership of it and objects to its seizure?" ("United States v.
King," 2010).
Court's ruling: The defendant looked to Georgia v. Randolph ("Georgia v.
Randolph," 2006) as a basis to negate the consent of the PC owner. The Lower
court relied on United States v. Matlock ("United States v. Matlock," 1974) in its
decision to uphold the guilty plea and sentencing. The Lower court reasoned that
both parties had common authority over the PC and its hard drive. The Superior
court found neither case controlling and stated "the facts of this case place it
somewhere between those cases" ("United States v. King," 2010).
The Superior court found that the rule in Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006)
does not go beyond the consent to search a home and does not apply to the
personal effects within. In this sense, the court follows Andrus' comparison of a
computer to a container and notes, "A computer is a personal effect" ("United
States v. Andrus," 2007) [cited in ("United States v. King," 2010)]. In this
approach the court used the "common authority" rule in Matlock ("United States
v. Matlock," 1974) in which both parties had access to the PC, shared passwords,
email accounts etc. Therefore, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy and
each party had the authority to grant consent regardless of whether one may had
refused the consent, unlike Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006).
Digital Forensic Implications: Returning to our original scenario of
Roommate A plugging in a USB flash drive into Roommate B's laptop.
Roommate B gives consent to examine the laptop. Does this consent extend to
the flash drive?
This would appear to be a similar case to King ("United States v. King," 2010).
In King, the officers did not permit the owner to remove a hard drive attached
to a computer, but the drive was permanently installed inside the case. In this
practical scenario the issue for digital forensic examiners would be whether the
acquisition of peripherals connected and in a multi-party residence extends to
multiple roommates sharing one computer/laptop. Thus, this scenario is similar
to the case of King ("United States v. King," 2010), and DFEs should be able
to seize all the peripherals attached to a common machine because consent has
been granted by one of the parties who accesses to the machine.
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3. APPARENT AUTHORITY
Moving from the idea of common authority and the communal access to media,
we now examine the concept of apparent authority and the perception that
someone has the authority within a particular scenario. In other words, when
someone has the reasonable belief that they have appropriate authority to conduct
an examination of certain media based on circumstances presented to him or her,
they should be permitted to do so. For instance, if a law enforcement officer is
given consent to examine the media, the officer may assume that person has the
right to give this consent if the surrounding circumstances presented to the officer
would lead him/her to reasonably believe that person has the authority to do so,
even if they are not the actual owner or custodian of the computer or in fact do not
have actual authority. United States v. Andrus (2007) illustrates factors that must
be taken into consideration when making this determination.
Digital Forensic Issue: A partner surrenders a cell phone and indicates that
the phone may be examined. Subsequently, the partner provides the pin login
code for the phone to the examiners.
3.1 Password Protected Files
Facts: Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) (4) (B) (UnitedStates, 2010b). However, he
retained the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion by the district
court during an investigation of a third-party billing and credit card company that
provided subscribers with access to websites containing child pornography. The
investigation of the company, Regpay, led the Agents of the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to investigate the subscribers, one
of them being the defendant, Ray Andrus.
Records reflected three people lived at the residence in question, two of which
were the defendant and his 91-year-old father, Dr. Andrus. The agent and the
police officer, with a verbal and signed consent, as well as the assistance of Dr.
Andrus, searched the room of Ray Andrus and analyzed his PC with EnCase
forensic software (GuidanceSoftware, 2010). This investigation led to the direct
access of the hard drive. There was no need to determine if the hard drive required
any user name or password. During this search certain .jpg files where found to
contain child pornography on the hard drive.
The search was temporarily suspended when law enforcement discovered this
was the only PC in the house and that Dr. Andrus was not the likely user. Thus,
actual authority may not have existed. However, the defendant subsequently gave
consent when law enforcement confronted him with their discovery. After
bringing the PC back to law enforcement headquarters it was later discovered
there was a user profile (with individual user name and password) for Ray
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Andrus.
Issue: This is a case of "first impression" meaning that this is the first time third
party consent relating to a computer has been addressed by the 10th Circuit Court
of Appeals. The issue before the court was whether there was apparent authority
to consent to the search by the defendant's father. The court needed to consider
the following information discovered by law enforcement personnel via an
interview with the third party, Dr. Andrus:


Dr. Andrus owned the house and lived there with family
members.



Dr. Andrus' house had Internet access. Dr. Andrus paid the
Internet and cable bill.



The email address associated with Dr. Andrus' account had
been activated and used to register on a website that provided
access to child pornography.



Ray Andrus lived in the center bedroom. Law enforcement
also knew that Dr. Andrus had access to the room at will. This
implied that Dr. Andrus had access to the computer.

Court's ruling: The court in this case stated that where there is either actual or
apparent authority to consent by a third party based on the totality of the
circumstances, the consent by the third party would be valid. The court described
actual authority as follows:
A third party has actual authority to consent to a search "if that third
party has either (1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access,
or (2) control for most purposes" ("United States v. Andrus," 2007)
[See also Matlock where holding "common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected" may give rise to a third party's valid consent to search
("United States v. Matlock," 1974).]
Where actual authority may be lacking apparent authority will suffice as stated
by the court:
Whether apparent authority exists is an objective, totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry into whether the facts available to the officers at
the time they commenced the search would lead a reasonable officer to
believe the third party had authority to consent to the search. ("Illinois
v. Rodriguez," 1990) ["[W]here an officer is presented with ambiguous
facts related to authority, he or she has a duty to investigate further
before relying on the consent." ("United States v. Kimoana," 2004).]
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Given the above findings, we must consider the following factors when
examining third party consent and how it applies within apparent authority in the
examination of digital media. If law enforcement has knowledge or reasonably
suspects that files are password protected, then the third party consent would not
be valid. Password protection implies a high degree of expectation of privacy.
However if law enforcement sees no perceived protection relating to computer
access the court states that "under our case law, however, officers are not
obligated to ask questions unless the circumstances are ambiguous ("United States
v. Kimoana," 2004). In short, if law enforcement reasonably believes apparent
authority exists, they have no affirmative duty to inquire further regarding
password-protected files. The court rejected the dissent's opinion asserting that it
is typical for computers to have password protection. Since there was no data or
facts on the record to substantiate this, the court did not go further into this
inquiry.
Therefore, we would argue that if the physical location of the computer is such
that a reasonable person would believe other members of the household had
common access to the computer, including the third party, the consent might be
valid. However if the third party disclaims access to the computer or files even if
the computer is in a common area, third party consent might not be valid.
("Trulock v. Freeh," 2001)
Digital Forensic Implication: In our practical example of one partner turning
over his/her partner's cell phone and the pin code number the examiner of the
phone could reasonably assume that the person has the authority to consent to a
search of the phone. However, if the examiner had doubts (viz. the name on the
phone or other information), he/she would be obligated to further investigate
before assuming that there was authority to consent.
4. THIRD PARTY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN PREMISES AND
COMMON AUTHORITY
Conflating common authority and potential apparent authority, we must consider
the scenario with multiple partners in residence who might jointly use a particular
piece of technology. This idea is typical with one party being the "owner" and the
other party residing in the residence. A common example would be a computer in
a dorm room owned by one roommate but used by others in the same area. In this
section we examine a case ("United States v. Nichols," 2009) that illustrates
factors that must be considered when making this determination.
Digital Forensics Issue: Can the examiner seize a laptop found in an
apartment with consent from a third party who does not own the property, but
is at the residence?
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Facts: Defendant Nichols lived with his girlfriend and her seven year old daughter
in a house owned solely by defendant. Girlfriend had lived in the home for past
three months, paying bills and receiving mail at the home. Moreover, she had
unrestricted access to the house and property in the house, including defendant's
computer. The girlfriend found an unlabeled computer disc with sexually explicit
photos of her daughter and gave the disc to the police. Based on the contents of
the disc, the police obtained a search warrant for Nichols' computer and found
matching sexually explicit photos as were on the computer disc.
Issue: Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained during the search of his home and computer. He claimed the
search was not authorized by a warrant. Defendant also asserted that his
girlfriend, who lived in Nichols' home but did not own the property, did not have
the authority to consent to a search of Nichols' home and computer.
Court's Ruling: The court cited Matlock which states that a "warrantless search is
valid where the consent to search is from a third party who possesses common
authority over the premises or effects" ("United States v. Matlock," 1974).
Common authority is described as a question of fact determined by factors such as
mutual use, joint access, and control ("United States v. Almeida Perez," 2008).
In this case, the girlfriend was a co-occupant of the home, enjoying unrestricted
access to the house and the computer. The court found that the girlfriend occupied
the house as a possessor, giving the girlfriend the authority to consent to the
search of the home and the computer.
In addition to common authority, the Court stated the girlfriend had "apparent
authority." Such authority is present when the "facts available to the officer at the
moment…warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting
party had authority over the premises" ("United States v. Almeida Perez," 2008).
In this situation the defendant's girlfriend met the police at the door of the home,
appeared familiar with the house, and freely operated the computer. These facts
suggest that the defendant's girlfriend is an occupant of the house capable of
granting consent.
The court did not address Nichol's claim that the police did not have a warrant,
but included in the facts portion of the opinion that police had obtained a warrant
prior to searching the home.
Digital Forensics Implication: In our laptop example, if the person granting
access was a resident of the apartment, even if they were not necessarily the
owner/rent payer, they would have the common authority to grant access to the
laptop under this case as well as the other cases cited in this paper, particularly
apparent authority.
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5. VOLUNTARY CONSENT
In this section we revisit the issue of passwords and the associated privacy
expectations in the context of the Fourth Amendment and its application within a
technological framework. Most illustrative of a potential scenario is the highprofile case of the United States v. Trulock ("United States v. Notra Trulock,
Linda Conrad," 2001).
Digital Forensics Issue: One of the more common challenges hinges on the
ability of one party to give the password for another party in a case. This
happens often in an organizational situation when one person provides the
password for another employee's desktop.
5.1 Search of Password Protected Files
Facts: Notra Trulock served as Director of Intelligence for the Department of
Energy (DOE) and later as the Director of the Office of Counter Intelligence.
Trulock alleged that he found evidence of a serious security breach at the Los
Alamos weapons Nuclear Laboratory by Chinese spies. He further alleged that the
CIA ignored his repeated warnings about the breach.
The breach was eventually made known to Congress and Trulock testified at
congressional hearings. Sometime later Trulock was demoted at DOE and
ultimately forced out in 1999. He documented the security breach and the "blind
eye" of the CIA in a manuscript later published in the National Review (Trulock,
2000a). Trulock contended that the government retaliated because of his
published account of the issues.
Trulock lived in a townhouse along with property owner Linda Conrad, a cocomplainant. Conrad was Executive Assistant to Trulock during his tenure at
DOE. She then reported to Trulock's successor Lawrence Sanchez. On July 14,
2000 Conrad alleged that Sanchez told her the FBI wanted to question her about
Trulock and informed her that FBI agents had a warrant to search the townhouse.
Moreover she claimed that Sanchez told her the agents would "break down the
front door in the presence of the media if she refused to cooperate" (Trulock,
2000b).
Two FBI agents arrived at the DOE and escorted Conrad to a conference room.
Agents were armed but did not display their weapons. During the three-hour
interview there were no allegations of raised voices or threats, but at some point
Conrad wished to make or answer phone calls. The record is unclear whether or
not agents told her she could or could not make the calls.
During the interview agents questioned Conrad about Trulock's personal records
and computer files. Conrad told agents she shared a computer with him, but each
maintained separate password protected files on the hard drive. Conrad noted that
they did not know each other's passwords and could not access each other's files.
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Agents gave Conrad a consent form and asked her to sign. There was no mention
of a search warrant or threat to "break down the door." Conrad alleged she was
both crying and shaking. At the townhouse, Trulock asked to see the search
warrant and agents told him Conrad had signed consent paperwork to search.
Agents searched the computer files for 90 minutes, including Trulock's password
protected files. The agents took custody of the hard drive before leaving the
townhouse.
Issues: A number of claims were presented by plaintiffs, including two important
questions:

1. Was Conrad's consent involuntary?
2. Was Conrad's consent, if voluntary, sufficient to permit the
search of Trulock's private computer files?
Court's Ruling: Two major issues the court considered focused on voluntary
consent first of the warrant and second of the computer search of password
protected files. Under ("Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," 1973), valid consent is
recognized as an exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
warrantless searches. However, consent to search is valid only if the consent was
knowing and voluntary under the "totality of the circumstances" test ("United
States v. Mendenhall," 1980).
In this case, the court found Conrad's consent to be invalid under the "Bumper"
rationale, which states, "the acquiescence to an assertion of lawful authority does
not constitute an understanding, intentional and voluntary waiver of rights under
the 4th amendment…where there is coercion there cannot be consent" ("Bumper
v. North Carolina," 1968).
Agents conducting the townhouse search never claimed to have a warrant;
however, Sanchez told Conrad the FBI possessed a warrant. The court found
Sanchez conveyed this message at the behest of the FBI and was acting in concert
with the FBI. Based on these facts, Conrad's consent was found to be involuntary.
(Despite this finding by the Court, the agents were found to have qualified
immunity.)
In terms of the computer search, plaintiffs contended that the search of Trulock's
password protected computer files violated the Fourth Amendment. The court,
already having found Conrad's consent to be involuntary, determined that even if
consent had been voluntary, Conrad was not authorized to consent to a search of
Trulock's password protected files.
In its findings, the court stated that valid third party consent must pass a twoprong test. First, the third party must have the authority to consent and second, the
consent must be voluntary. Authority to consent is found by "mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so
that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
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permit the inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched" ("United
States v. Matlock," 1974).
Ultimately, the court found Conrad lacked the authority to properly consent to a
search of Trulock's password protected files. Despite mutual use of the computer
kept in Conrad's bedroom, both Conrad and Trulock kept their files separate, as
well as protected by passwords and neither of them disclosed their passwords to
each other. While the court recognized that Conrad had the authority to consent to
a general search of the computer, her authority "did not extend to Trulock's
password protected files" ("Trulock v. Freeh," 2001).
To make this determination the court relied on the Block case ("United States v.
Block," 1978). In this case, the Block court held that the defendant's mother had
authority to consent to a search of defendant's room in the home they shared, but
the authority did not extend to a "locked footlocker located within the room. The
authority to consent cannot be thought automatically to extend to the interiors of
every discrete enclosed space capable of search within the area…the rule has to
be one of reason that assesses the critical circumstances indicating the presence or
absence of a discrete expectation of privacy with respect to the particular object"
("United States v. Block," 1978).
In its decision, the court considered Trulock's password protected files to be
analogous to Block's locked footlocker. By using a password, Trulock
affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and others from his personal files. Thus,
Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the password-protected files
and Conrad's authority did not extend to them. (Despite this finding, the Court
again found qualified immunity for the actions of the agents in the improper
search.)
Digital Forensics Implications: Thus, it would appear that if another party
provides the password, it would be a violation on any files/areas protected by
that password so long as the items weren't shared. If the items were shared
(even with different logins) it would seem that the search could proceed.
6. OVERALL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We would be remiss not to stress the need for Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE)
and law enforcement to communicate frequently with one another to promote
knowledge exchange. It is one of the most effective means to bridge procedural
gaps between the two areas as they increasingly work in conjunction with each
other in diverse cases. This is especially important because as more DFEs enter
the profession from non-law enforcement backgrounds, we will experience an
increase in privacy violations that will lead to evidence challenges in court.
Ultimately, it is imperative for Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE) to set policies in
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order to ensure privacy in each individual case to minimize the impact of privacy
violations. We recommend that several key policies areas must be implemented:
1. The recovery of password-protected files should only be
conducted with the express consent of the owner of the file
(the person who created the password).
2. Seizure of peripherals should be acceptable even if the
peripheral belongs to a third party as long as it is attached to
the seized device.
3. Third parties should be able to provide consent for devices that
are located in common areas.
4. Third parties should be able to provide consent for files that
are in shared media space.
While we realize that these rules apply specifically to law enforcement, it prudent
to implement these guidelines to receive consent in the same context in civil
investigations to avoid later challenges to collected evidence.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have provided several United States Federal courts' key cases that
can provide direction to the DFE practitioner. In our research we argue that DFEs
should be aware of how decisions in various Federal Courts may impact their
ability to acquire evidence in both civil and criminal settings. Digital Forensics,
being a relatively new field, is particularly subject to changing and evolving law
as cases and appeals are decided. We have found that as the field develops, judges
and attorneys are undertaking a more informed technical and legal analysis.
While these cases apply to law enforcement, it is prudent for practicing DFE
professionals to be aware of challenges that may emerge against procured digital
evidence. This is particularly applicable to private investigators practicing Digital
Forensics who will frequently encounter diverse types of consent situations.
Ultimately, our research provides critical insight to Digital Examiners on how the
courts view computer forensics by way of evidentiary, fourth amendment and
other legal issues brought on appeal. Given the limited precedent regarding the
subject matter, courts often rely on analogies that are not computer technology
based. Through our research, we were able to apply an analysis of these cases into
the technical realm.
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